Con l’inizio dell’estate riesplode in Italia il problema degli arrivi via mare. Il terzo "Fact Checking" dell’ISPI (dopo quelli sull’euro e su Trump) fa il punto sulla questione migranti, partendo da affermazioni che in genere ne caratterizzano il dibattito e cercando di fornire informazioni e spunti di riflessione fondati il più possibile su dati oggettivi.

1. Sempre più migranti arrivano e restano in Italia ---VERO--- se si considerano solo gli arrivi via mare (sbarchi), cresciuti da una media di 25 mila nel decennio 2004–2013 a 170 mila nel 2014–2016. Nel primo semestre del 2017 c’è stato peraltro un ulteriore incremento di circa il 15% rispetto allo stesso periodo dell’anno scorso. Ma il quadro delle migrazioni verso l’Italia va completato considerando l’immigrazione netta, che agli sbarchi somma l’immigrazione legale (composta principalmente da rumeni, albanesi, marocchini e ucraini) e sottrae chi lascia l’Italia (tra 2010 e 2016, il numero degli stranieri che hanno lasciato il Paese è più che raddoppiato, e oggi sfiora le 150 mila unità). L’immigrazione netta è calata a 305 mila persone all’anno nel triennio 2014–2016, rispetto a una media di 350 mila persone all’anno nel decennio precedente (2004–2013). Senza ulteriori ingressi di stranieri, la popolazione italiana si ridurrebbe di oltre 140 mila abitanti all’anno.    2. I migranti verso l’Ue sbarcano  principalmente in Italia ---VERO--- La crisi greca iniziata nell’estate 2015 è stata solo una parentesi, che si è chiusa quasi del tutto dopo che a marzo 2016 è stato raggiunto il controverso accordo tra UE e Turchia. Da aprile 2016 in poi è riemerso il trend di lungo periodo, che vede da tempo l’Italia quale primo paese di arrivo per chi raggiunge l’Europa via mare. È così sia in periodi di "ordinaria amministrazione" (come nel 2010 o il 2012, anni di sbarchi relativamente modesti), sia in periodi di flussi intensi come quelli degli ultimi anni.   3. In Italia arrivano soprattutto persone  che scappano da guerre e conflitti ---FALSO--- È impossibile stabilire con certezza le cause principali che spingono i singoli migranti a mettersi in viaggio. Proprio per questo, da almeno un decennio l’Alto commissariato Onu per i rifugiati preferisce parlare di "flussi misti". È tuttavia possibile tentare una prima stima per capire se i flussi diretti verso l’Italia siano composti in primo luogo da persone che scappano da guerre e conflitti, o da persone alla ricerca di condizioni economiche migliori. Dai dati sull’immigrazione in Italia nel 2016, emerge che il 62% dei flussi è costituito da persone che arrivano in Italia in maniera regolare. A questi "migranti economici" si possono sommare le persone che, pur giungendo via mare, se facessero richiesta d’asilo vedrebbero probabilmente rifiutata la loro domanda, ovvero il 23% dell’immigrazione totale. Possiamo quindi calcolare che per ogni 100 ingressi in Italia l’anno scorso almeno 85 fossero attribuibili a ragioni prevalentemente economiche.   4. Sull’identificazione dei migranti l’Italia è inadempiente ---FALSO--- Malgrado un rapporto dell’OCSE sottolinei come solo il 29% dei migranti sbarcati in Italia sia passato dagli hotspot dell’Unione europea, oggi l’Italia identifica comunque la quasi totalità delle persone che arrivano sulle proprie coste.  L’affermazione sarebbe stata invece vera nella prima fase della crisi migratoria in Europa (2013–settembre 2015), quando l’Italia procedeva all’identificazione solo nel 36% dei casi. Anche per questo, molti migranti erano più liberi di tentare l’attraversamento delle frontiere italiane verso paesi del Nord Europa, senza timore di essere "ritrasferiti" in Italia in applicazione del regolamento di Dublino.   5. I ricollocamenti in Europa non funzionano ---VERO--- L’impegno preso nel 2015 dall’Ue con l’Italia era quello di ricollocare circa 35.000 richiedenti asilo verso altri Stati membri entro settembre 2017. Al 27 giugno, dunque a pochi mesi dalla fine del programma di ricollocamento, dall’Italia erano stati tuttavia ricollocati solo 7.277 richiedenti asilo (soprattutto verso Germania, Norvegia e Finlandia). Per capire quanto modesto sia il dato, basti pensare che solo il 26 giugno sono stati soccorsi in mare 13.500 migranti. Ma anche se l’Unione europea avesse mantenuto totalmente l’impegno sui ricollocamenti, avrebbe alleggerito l’Italia solo per il 10% del totale delle richieste d’asilo dal 2013 a oggi (circa 345.000).   6. Le strutture di accoglienza italiane sono sature ---VERO--- ma ci sono precise responsabilità. A oggi i migranti e richiedenti asilo accolti in centri di prima e seconda accoglienza sono circa 179.000. Il Governo sta cercando di identificare strutture per arrivare a 200.000 posti entro fine anno. A dicembre 2016 l’Associazione nazionale dei comuni italiani (Anci) aveva raggiunto un’intesa con il Ministero dell’Interno perché i Comuni fino a 2000 abitanti accogliessero 6 richiedenti asilo ciascuno, mentre quelli oltre i 2000 abitanti ne prendessero 3,5 ogni 1000 abitanti. Se pienamente applicato, il piano permetterebbe di offrire prima e seconda accoglienza a circa 200.000 persone. La realtà tuttavia è che, mentre molte città e centri maggiori stanno facendo quanto richiesto dal piano nazionale, a oggi solo 2.880 su 8.000 comuni accolgono almeno un richiedente asilo.   7. Si può vietare l’ingresso nei porti italiani  alle navi straniere con migranti? ---SÌ--- È possibile affermare che l’Italia non sia necessariamente e a priori l’unico "luogo sicuro" dove sbarcare le persone salvate una volta portata a termine un’operazione SAR (search and rescue) da parte di una nave che non batta bandiera italiana. Sul piano del diritto internazionale, dunque, l’Italia avrebbe gli strumenti per affermare legittimamente che non dovrebbe essere considerata "di default" il luogo in cui sbarcare i migranti salvati nel Mediterraneo centrale. Vanno però al riguardo evidenziate alcune zone grigie. Per esempio, le convenzioni UNCLOS, SOLAS e SAR stabiliscono l’obbligo di assistere le persone in pericolo in mare e di condurre i sopravvissuti in un "luogo sicuro geograficamente vicino". Nella designazione di luogo sicuro, il comitato esecutivo dell ’UNHCR ha precisato (conclusione n. 23 del 1981) che in quel luogo non solo deve sussistere il rispetto dei "bisogni umani essenziali (vitto, alloggio e necessità mediche)", ma che debbano essere rispettati i diritti umani e quelli dei rifugiati – in particolare tutelando il diritto di non refoulement (non respingimento). Al momento, però, l’assenza di una chiara definizione vincolante di luogo sicuro, e di un accordo su quali stati lo siano, crea incertezza anche rispetto alla recente posizione assunta dall’Italia. A giocare a favore dell’Italia è invece il fatto che la convenzione SAR prevede che a coordinare le operazioni di soccorso e salvataggio sia il paese cui compete quel tratto di mare (qui una mappa dettagliata). In teoria, negli anni precedenti molte operazioni di salvataggio sarebbero dunque state competenza di Malta – anche nel caso di barconi che si avvicinassero a Lampedusa, isola italiana che si trova all’interno della zona SAR maltese. Oggi però i salvataggi vengono spesso effettuati a ridosso delle acque territoriali libiche, dunque nella zona SAR della Libia. Essendo evidente che la Libia non possa essere considerata "luogo sicuro", e con Malta che si tira indietro giustificandosi con l’impossibilità di accogliere nuovi migranti viste le dimensioni dell’isola (su cui abitano poco più di 430.000 persone), la responsabilità ricade sulle autorità italiane. Nella sostanza, il nodo è di natura principalmente politica. Se l’Italia desse davvero seguito alla dichiarata intenzione di negare l’accesso ai propri porti a navi battenti bandiera straniera, e gli altri paesi europei non decidessero di sostituirsi all’Italia, si potrebbe correre il rischio di tornare a una situazione simile a quella dell’inizio del 2015. In quei mesi alla missione italiana Mare Nostrum si era sostituita la prima versione dell’operazione europea Triton, che aveva arretrato il baricentro dei salvataggi a ridosso delle acque italiane. In coincidenza dell’inizio di Triton erano aumentate le morti in mare, fino al tragico naufragio nel Canale di Sicilia del 18 aprile, nel quale persero la vita tra le 700 e le 900 persone e che convinse l’Europa a spostare le operazioni di Triton molto più a sud. La posizione italiana andrebbe probabilmente letta anche quale punto di partenza per discussioni politiche, come per esempio quelle che si sono tenute oggi a Berlino in preparazione del vertice G20 di luglio, o quelle previste il 6–7 luglio a Tallinn in occasione della riunione informale dei ministri Ue di Giustizia e Affari interni.   8. Risolvendo le crisi (Libia in primis) il flusso si interromperà ---VERO--- ma soprattutto per chi fugge da guerre e conflitti. Nel breve periodo, gli shock causati da guerre e instabilità politica hanno certamente aggravato l’intensità dei flussi migratori verso l’Europa. E il "buco nero" causato dalla crisi libica è sicuramente un fattore facilitante in un quadro in cui i trafficanti colludono con potentati e milizie locali. Ma, a differenza degli sbarchi in Grecia (nel 2015–2016 il 90% degli arrivi sulle coste greche era composto da siriani, afghani o iracheni, persone plausibilmente in fuga da conflitti), i flussi verso l’Italia sono solo in parte legati a conflitti (vedi punto 3) e i migranti giungono soprattutto dall’Africa subsahariana. Sul lungo periodo questi ultimi continueranno ad arrivare, per ragioni demografiche ed economiche. Sul versante demografico le previsioni dell’Onu al 2050 prevedono una popolazione dell’Unione europea sostanzialmente stabile (peraltro solo nel caso in cui l’afflusso di stranieri si mantenesse attorno al milione all’anno), mentre il numero di abitanti dei paesi dell’Africa subsahariana è destinato a raddoppiare, passando da uno a due miliardi. Sul fronte economico, inoltre, nonostante i tanti progressi fatti negli ultimi trent’anni, la regione dell’Africa subsahariana denuncia a tutt’oggi un livello di redditi pro capite tra i più bassi al mondo (1.652 dollari all’anno, contro i 34.861 dollari dell’UE28). Demografia e differenze di reddito continueranno dunque a rappresentare importanti fattori di attrazione verso l’Europa.   9. Tra i migranti e i richiedenti asilo  si nascondono terroristi ---FALSO--- o quasi. Tra chi ha commesso o tentato di commettere attentati in Europa tra il 2014 e oggi, solo 8 persone avevano molto probabilmente raggiunto il continente seguendo le rotte migratorie. Considerando che sono oltre 1,5 milioni le persone che sono arrivate in Europa negli ultimi tre anni, si tratta di circa lo 0,0005% del totale. In particolare, delle 65 persone che hanno commesso attentati di stampo islamista in Europa tra giugno 2014 e giugno 2017, il 73% era un cittadino del paese in cui è stata portata a termine l’operazione terroristica. Un altro 14% è composto da residenti legali o da "visitatori" provenienti dai paesi europei confinanti, mentre solo il 5% (3 persone) era rifugiato o richiedente asilo (vedi Rapporto ISPI). Guardando al futuro è comunque consigliabile prudenza. In primo luogo, un recente rapporto dell’Europol spiega come tra 2015 e 2016 siano stati documentati 300 casi di tentativi di radicalizzazione da parte di reclutatori dello Stato islamico rivolti verso persone in viaggio verso l’Europa e che avevano intenzione di richiedere asilo. Inoltre la maggior parte degli attentati in Europa è stato eseguito da cittadini di seconda o terza generazione. Non è dunque detto che, con il passare degli anni, i figli dei migranti che si stabiliscono in Europa oggi siano immuni dai richiami della propaganda islamista. In ogni caso, la radicalizzazione in Europa avviene principalmente in carcere o nei quartieri periferici delle città, come Molenbeek e Schaerbeek, non a Lampedusa.   10. Rifugiati e richiedenti asilo pesano  sulle tasche degli italiani ---VERO--- sul breve periodo, mentre sul lungo ---DIPENDE--- da quanto riusciremo a integrarli. Nel breve periodo, è innegabile che i richiedenti asilo rappresentino un costo per le casse dello stato. Nel 2016 l’Italia ha speso 3,6 miliardi di euro per soccorso in mare e accoglienza, e nel 2017 questa cifra dovrebbe salire a 4,2 miliardi (lo 0,22% del PIL). Per confronto, la cifra equivale a quanto lo stato prevede di spendere per lo sviluppo residenziale, o alla spesa italiana in aiuti allo sviluppo.  L’Ue aiuta l’Italia in due modi: stanziando delle risorse, che nel 2017 hanno raggiunto quota 750 milioni (coprendo dunque meno del 20% dei costi previsti), e permettendo all’Italia di sforare il vincolo sul deficit, per un ammontare pari ogni anno alle spese aggiuntive rispetto all’anno precedente (nel 2017 potrebbe trattarsi di circa 600 milioni). Va sottolineato che la "flessibilità" sulle spese pubbliche significa che lo Stato italiano aumenta di fatto il proprio deficit, che dovrà comunque essere ripagato in futuro. I costi di breve periodo dipendono anche dal fatto che la legge italiana non permette a un richiedente asilo di lavorare prima che siano trascorsi 60 giorni dalla presentazione della domanda di protezione, e che per un richiedente asilo è comunque difficile trovare lavoro prima che si sia concluso l’iter della richiesta, che in media richiede due anni. È chiaro inoltre che i migranti minorenni siano un semplice "costo" (peraltro significativamente superiore rispetto ai migranti maggiorenni, perchè gli vengono riconosciuti maggiori diritti). In un’ottica di lungo periodo, l’esperienza pregressa dimostra che il contributo netto alle finanze pubbliche di rifugiati e altre persone protette, pur partendo da una condizione di svantaggio, tende nel tempo ad avvicinarsi a quello di chi migra in maniera regolare. L’Ocse calcola che un capofamiglia di una famiglia migrante residente in Italia da almeno cinque anni fornisca in media un contributo fiscale netto (maggiori versamenti rispetto ai prelievi) di 9.000 euro l’anno. In altri paesi avanzati, in generale, l’impatto dei migranti sulle casse statali tende a essere neutro (raramente supera lo 0,5% del PIL del paese, in positivo o in negativo), e dunque non pesa né allevia significativamente la pressione sulle casse statali.   11. I migranti ci rubano il lavoro  e abbassano gli stipendi ---FALSO--- ma alcune situazioni richiedono attenzione. Raramente l’arrivo di un pur ingente numero di migranti incide in maniera significativa sui posti di lavoro e sul livello dei salari di un paese. Lo dimostra un vasto numero di studi nei paesi Ocse, dagli Usa al Regno Unito, dalla Germania all’Italia. È vero invece che i migranti vengono pagati in media meno dei nativi, spesso anche a distanza di decenni dal loro arrivo in un paese. Negli Stati Uniti, una serie di studi sull’afflusso di 125.000 cubani in Florida nel famoso "esodo di Mariel" del 1980 ha dimostrato che non c‘è stato un effetto sui salari dei lavoratori locali. Allo stesso modo, uno studio del 2016 ha stimato che un ingente afflusso di richiedenti asilo in Danimarca negli anni Novanta ha spinto la manodopera locale a reimpiegarsi in lavori maggiormente qualificati, con un effetto addirittura positivo sui salari. Al netto di questi studi di lungo periodo, però, un improvviso ingresso di persone nel mercato del lavoro può avere effetti negativi sulla capacità di conservare il proprio posto da parte di lavoratori poco qualificati che abbiano operato in un solo settore per decenni, soprattutto in situazioni di alta concentrazione locale di migranti.   12. I migranti aumentano la criminalità ---DIPENDE--- I reati non possono essere contati direttamente: l‘unico modo che si ha per stimarli è osservare i destinatari di denunce e le persone in carcere. Dai dati emerge che, a fronte di una presenza di stranieri in Italia equivalente all‘8,3% della popolazione nel 2015, le denunce nei confronti degli stranieri (escludendo quelle a carico di ignoti) erano il 32% del totale, mentre la popolazione carceraria era costituita per il 33% da stranieri. In altri termini, su 1000 stranieri presenti sul territorio italiano circa 3,5 sono in carcere, mentre su 1000 italiani lo 0,6 è detenuto. Sembra dunque che uno straniero abbia una probabilità di essere arrestato di oltre cinque volte superiore rispetto a quella di un italiano. Questi dati mascherano tuttavia una realtà più complessa. Innanzitutto, mentre stranieri e italiani vengono incarcerati in misura simile per certi tipi di reati violenti, come per esempio le lesioni dolose (5,5% dei reati per entrambe le nazionalità), gli stranieri vengono incarcerati in misura superiore per reati connessi alla produzione e spaccio di stupefacenti (45% contro 36%). Inoltre, all‘aumentare dei migranti non sembra aumentare il loro "livello di delinquenza". Tra 2009 e 2015, a fronte di un aumento del 47% degli stranieri residenti la popolazione carceraria straniera è scesa dal 37% al 33% del totale. Se dunque gli stranieri continuano a essere denunciati e a finire in carcere di più rispetto agli italiani, non sembra essere provata la tesi per la quale una maggiore densità di stranieri fa aumentare la loro criminalità (per esempio perché farebbe crescere la loro marginalizzazione e segregazione).

Si apre domani ad Amburgo il summit G20, l’incontro annuale dei leader delle maggiori economie mondiali. Come per il G7 di maggio, il rischio è quello di un vertice contraddistinto dalle divisioni, in particolare a causa dei crescenti contrasti tra gli Stati Uniti e altri partecipanti, inclusi i partner europei. Anche in questo caso la probabilità di fare significativi passi avanti rischia di essere bassa soprattutto dopo l’annuncio di Trump di inizio giugno in merito al ritiro unilaterale degli Stati Uniti dagli accordi di Parigi e alle accuse rivolte alla Germania – proprio nell ’anno della sua presidenza – di pratiche commerciali scorrette per sostenere il proprio enorme surplus commerciale. D’altra parte, la configurazione “allargata” del vertice potrebbe contribuire a stemperare gli animi, inserendo le diatribe bilaterali in un contesto piú ampio. Riuscirà la presidenza tedesca a evitare un ulteriore allontanamento degli Stati Uniti dai forum multilaterali e a ottenere risultati concreti come nei summit di maggior successo?

Commercio e clima, i temi caldi in agenda Il G7 italiano di fine maggio è la cartina di tornasole per guardare a quello che potrebbe accadere domani e sabato ad Amburgo (vedi ISPI Dossier G7). Lo scorso maggio, i leader dei grandi paesi avanzati si sono infatti divisi su commercio internazionale e clima, arrivando a un “Trump contro tutti”: una spaccatura tra alleati che non si vedeva dalle discussioni sull’intervento americano in Iraq durante i G8 dell’epoca Bush. Il G20 riversa queste stesse tensioni in un contesto più allargato ed eterogeneo, riunendo sia paesi che hanno un forte interesse a controbattere alle argomentazioni statunitensi (come il Messico sul dossier migrazioni), sia stretti alleati dell’amministrazione americana (come l’Arabia Saudita). Tuttavia, i due temi “caldi” restano tali. Sul fronte del contrasto al cambiamento climatico, i leader dei più grandi paesi europei hanno risposto all’annuncio di Trump sul ritiro dagli accordi di Parigi dichiarando che accordi non sono negoziabili. Intanto, la Cina si candida a riempire il vuoto lasciato da Washington, ed è ormai da anni leader mondiale nella produzione di pale eoliche e pannelli fotovoltaici. Per quanto riguarda il commercio internazionale si profila invece un nuovo scontro tra paesi in deficit e paesi in surplus commerciale. Gli Stati Uniti, capofila dei paesi con un deficit ormai di lungo corso (per quest’anno l’IMF prevede un deficit commerciale di oltre 500 miliardi di dollari, il 2,6% del PIL statunitense), hanno deciso di portare sul banco degli imputati non solo la Cina, che di recente ha ridotto il proprio surplus (previsto al 1,3% nel 2017 rispetto a un massimo del 10% nel 2007), ma anche l’Unione europea e, in particolare, proprio la Germania che presenta un enorme surplus commerciale (+8,2% del PIL) e si attira le critiche anche di molti paesi europei.   La parabola del G20: da "pilastro" a un summit "come tanti altri"? Nel loro commentary realizzato per l’ISPI, John Kirton e Brittaney Warren del G20 Research Group sostengono che “sia legittimo chiedersi se ai summit G20 sia ancora necessario dedicare così tanta attenzione”. È stata la crisi internazionale del 2008–2009 a sancire il passaggio di testimone sui temi della governance economica e finanziaria internazionale, dal G7/G8 al G20. E proprio al G20 viene spesso accreditato il merito di avere spinto i leader mondiali a rispondere in maniera coordinata alla crisi finanziaria, evitando che una profonda recessione si trasformasse in una prolungata depressione – soprattutto attraverso uno stimolo globale congiunto nell’ordine dei 2.000 miliardi di dollari. Ma con il passare degli anni e il recedere della crisi, il numero dei temi in agenda nel forum è aumentato in misura crescente. E, secondo i critici, di pari passo sarebbe diminuita la tendenza dei membri G20 a tener fede alle promesse. “All’opposto”, continuano Kirton e Warren, “i dati dimostrano che il G20 mantiene davvero gli impegni presi, in particolare i più importanti. Dei 198 impegni prioritari monitorati dal G20 Research Group, i paesi G20 ne hanno perseguiti e realizzati in media il 71%”.  Si tratterà ora di capire se il summit riuscirà a andare oltre le aspettative anche in un clima di crescente distanza politica tra le maggiori economie mondiali, o se invece rischierà di essere declassato a un summit “come tanti altri”.   Il G20 di Merkel: diplomazia o testa bassa? Berlino ha lanciato una serie di segnali ambigui circa la volontà di andare alla ricerca di soluzioni diplomatiche alle tante tensioni che si sono accumulate sul vertice di quest’anno. Solo il 29 giugno scorso, Merkel aveva infatti annunciato che “avrebbe dato battaglia” contro le visioni protezionistiche e antiambientaliste di Trump. Lunedì scorso, comunque, Trump ha chiamato Merkel e Gentiloni alla ricerca di una possibile mediazione. Secondo Michele Valensise, già Ambasciatore d’Italia a Berlino e Presidente del Centro Italo-Tedesco per l’Eccellenza Europea Villa Vigoni “il G20 è un appuntamento importante per la Germania, attenta non da oggi ai temi globali in agenda: commercio, clima, crescita sostenibile. Con metodo la Cancelliera Merkel ha preparato il terreno con i partner europei. Ora si tratta di gestire Trump. Le divergenze con Washington sono evidenti, ma non aspettiamoci colpi di scena, bensì una paziente ricerca di margini d’intesa: la Germania difenderà le sue idee, incluso il valore fondamentale del rapporto transatlantico”. Già oggi Merkel e Trump si incontreranno per affrontare i temi del terrorismo internazionale e del finanziamento delle missioni Onu di peacekeeping. Argomenti importanti, ma che almeno ufficialmente non includono nei colloqui i due temi fonte di aspro scontro, ovvero commercio e cambiamento climatico.   Africa: un approccio più "tedesco" Secondo Tiziana Corda dell’ISPI alla Germania "va il merito di aver messo per la prima volta lo sviluppo economico africano tra le priorità dell’agenda delle principali economie mondiali". Nella cornice del G20, la presidenza di turno tedesca ha inserito diversi incontri che hanno coinvolto partner africani, il più importante dei quali è certamente stato la G20 Africa Partnership Conference, tenutasi il 12 e 13 giugno a Berlino. La Germania si è assunta la responsabilità di guidare l’iniziativa, improntando le discussioni soprattutto sulla base di un nuovo "piano Marshall per l’Africa" presentato a gennaio dal Ministero tedesco per la Cooperazione allo sviluppo. La proposta di Berlino sono i "Compacts with Africa" un nuovo approccio per i rapporti bilaterali tra i paesi G20 e quelli del continente africano che prevedono l’affiancamento di investimenti privati agli aiuti allo sviluppo. Da un lato, però, gli schemi proposti (che insistono su crescita sostenibile, sviluppo infrastrutturale e occupazione giovanile) sono semplici modelli che ciascun paese G20 può decidere se seguire o meno. Dall’ltro, la vasta discrezionalità lasciata a ciascuna presidenza annuale del vertice circa i temi da inserire in agenda (oltre alla classica cooperazione economica e finanziaria) getta molte ombre sulle conseguenze del passaggio di testimone nel 2018 all’Argentina, paese che potrebbe avere incentivi decisamente inferiori a inserire nell’agenda del summit grandi piani di sviluppo per l’Africa.

Fourteen years have passed since the European Union-Western Balkan summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003 where the process know as the Thessaloniki Agenda was adopted  confirming the EU accession perspective for the countries of the region. The language adopted was unequivocal: “The future of the Balkans is within the European Union”.

A lot has happened in the intervening period, with all the countries of the region now at varying stages of their integration into the EU. The EU itself remains by far the most important trading partner for the region, and largest provider of financial assistance. Perhaps the greatest signal of the region’s coming closer to the EU and its impact in terms of tangible benefits for the citizens was the granting of visa free travel to the Schengen area to all the Western Balkan countries with the exception of Kosovo, which is waiting anxiously for that to happen.

A fragile region.

Yet, the region remains fragile. Under a veneer of normality lies a climate of deep mistrust with governing elites and between different ethnic communities. The region has witnessed in the past few years a considerable degradation in democratic standards, with state institutions increasingly under threat. The European Commission’s most recent Communication on the EU Enlargement Policy published last November points to several countries in the region showing “clear symptoms and varying degrees of state capture”. The deterioration of standards has affected all areas of governance, whether it is functioning of the Parliamentary institutions, independence of the judiciary, the electoral process or media freedom. The  increased levels of corruption and organised crime in drugs, arms and other illicit trade, representing by themselves a real source of instability, become even more alarming when these activities are protected through state and political institutions.  

While the growth rate in some of the countries may seem impressive, it means little in terms of improved employment rates or living standards in the region. Quite the contrary, unemployment remains unacceptably high with youth most affected, reaching over 60% in some countries; social inequalities have deepened with many living below the poverty line,while education standards continue to deteriorate with a huge lack of government investment.

Failure to address these weaknesses in time has only added to the fragile environment. The authoritarian behaviour of  ruling  parties such as in the case of Macedonia up to the change of government two months ago, further contributed to an increasingly polarised society, with outbreaks of violence and the demonisation of civil society actors and the media.

The EU losing ground.

While the countries of the region are not devoid of blame, it is the EU which bears a lot of the responsibility for allowing this deterioration to happen, despite the fact that in 2011 it placed the rule of law at the heart of the EU’s accession process. This “fundamentals first” approach was a welcome development, with its emphasis on reforms relating to the rule of law, human and fundamental rights, democratic institutions and public administration, as well as economic reforms and competitiveness.

But its failure to follow this up with effective monitoring and implementation mechanisms led to the EU losing a lot of ground in the Western Balkan region. By taking its foot off the pedal and pursuing a ‘business as usual’ technocratic approach with its annual country reports, it failed to grasp the deep malaise undermining the reform process. Even though the warning signs were clearly visible, the EU  ignored or downplayed their significance.

Indeed the increasingly critical assessments contained in the country reports should have alerted the EU institutions and the EU member states not only that the enlargement policy was not delivering as it should, but also that it was not addressing the re-emerging fault lines from the Balkans’ troubled history.  Its enlargement strategy appeared to be out of touch with reality on the ground and in the process losing credibility.

When the High Representative Federica Mogherini traveled to the region in early March, she was confronted with the brutal reality that all was not well in the EU’s nearest neighbourhood. This was a visit which should have happened months ago; indeed for some of the countries, it was her first visit since taking up office in 2014. A succession of statements by the EU and meetings with the region’s leaders followed her visit, a signal that the Western Balkan region was finally back on the EU agenda.

What needs to be done.

The forthcoming summit of EU and Western Balkan leaders under the so-called “Berlin Process”, which will be hosted by Italy in Trieste, offers an opportunity for the High Representative and those EU member state leaders present to re-affirm their political commitment to the accession process for the region as well as ensuring concrete and effective follow up to agreements reached.

In particular this should be an opportunity for greater emphasis to be placed on rule of law and democratic governance, issues which have tended to be sidelined in previous summits and indeed in bilateral discussions between individual EU member states and countries in the region. This was blatantly the case in the context of the refugee crisis in 2015 when the EU and the countries closest to the region such as Austria and Hungary obtained commitments in setting up border control mechanisms from those countries,notably Serbia and Macedonia, in the front line of the migration flows. The latter were only too happy to oblige, providing them with a convenient excuse to divert attention from their increasingly authoritarian behaviour inside their own countries.

As we have seen in several cases , maintaining stability at the expense of the rule of law and government accountability is a recipe for failure in the long run. Even though the focus at the previous three summits of the “Berlin Process” has been mainly on regional cooperation and connectivity in the energy and transport sectors, these programmes and economic reforms will be meaningless without effective rule of law and functioning legal standards. The EU should take effective action on what is stated in the European Commission’s 2016 Enlargement Policy Communication :”Given the impact of the rule of law on economic governance, the Commission will pay particular attention to the links between these pillars of the accession process”.

It will also be necessary for  the EU to substantially increase its visibility in the region, otherwise other actors, such as Russia, will be only too happy to fill the vacuum even though they have little if anything to offer. This means more frequent visits by the EU’s highest representatives, and a much more ‘hands on’ approach by the EU institutions, increasing the sense of the region belonging to and being an integral part of the EU integration process. Perceptions play a big role in a region where the weight of history still looms larger than in any other part of Europe. ( President Juncker’s 2014 statement that there would be no enlargement during the mandate of the current Commission, while understood within the Brussels bubble, went down like a cold shower in the region itself).

In addition to being more visible,the EU should also speak out more often and more forcefully  when governments and political leaders are ignoring or violating commitments to reform.There needs to be greater emphasis on the EU communicating its messages in a clear, open and transparent manner, particularly when there are repeated failures in democratic standards. These are after all countries aspiring to join the EU, which gives the EU an added responsibility.

Engagement with civil society and local communities.

Perhaps the most critical factor which can impact on the success or failure of the EU’s commitment to the region is its engagement with civil society actors and local communities. Too often, the EU and its member states devote more attention to dialogue with the political elites, thus further entrenching those elites in their grip on power, even when they continue to violate the ‘fundamentals’. This approach ignores the fact that most if not the entire region is composed of societies emerging from conflict, with leaders intent on retaining power by whatever means possible.

If there is one lesson that has been learned from post conflict peace processes around the world, it is the fundamental role of civil society actors in nation building and reconciliation. They are best placed to build bridges across the political and ethnic divide, and of creating a climate of trust at the local level - where it matters most. Indeed they are often the only ones who can push for greater accountability of political leaders in the absence of the normal check and balances that we take for granted in democratic societies.

At a time when civil society organisations are under attack whether within the region or within some EU member countries, it is more vital than ever that the EU demonstrates in word and deed that engaging with civil society actors and local communities forms an integral part of its strategic relationship with the countries of the region. This would also send a clear message to the governments in the region of the imperative necessity to guarantee direct participation from those actors in the development of policies and reform legislation, a consultation process with meaning. This would ensure a more inclusive and more democratic governance of benefit to the entire society.

Perhaps the best way to ensure that the countries of the  region are no longer in  ‘stand-by’ mode would be for the EU to start a process of engaging, whether through screening or actual negotiations, with each of the countries on the areas covered by Chapters 23 ( Judiciary and Fundamental Rights ) and 24 ( Justice, Freedom and Security ) of the EU accession process. This would lock the applicant countries in an intensive and intrusive interaction with the EU institutions that would help to keep the reform process on track.

The EU has all the necessary tools at its disposal to restore credibility to its enlargement policy and its relationship with the Western Balkans. It should not forget that it is  the only actor that can provide stability and a more secure future for the Balkan region. 

Erwan Fouéré, Associate Senior Research Fellow, CEPS

DOSSIER

The well-established cliché of the Balkans' long-term instability may just be sparring with an  almost opposite concern. While the region has recently been experiencing rising instability, the West's political goal (or illusion?) of maintaining the status quo at any price may eventually result in a serious backlash.

Experts increasingly warn about the serious risks stemming from the consolidation of a vicious “stabilitocracy” – a term that was coined to describe Milo Đukanović's twenty-year long regime in Montenegro and quickly became usage to describe similar situations across the Western Balkans.

"Stabilitocracy" stands for the strong illiberal elements of the region's current political regimes, but it also – primarily – stresses the equivocal role of the West in supporting the local semi-authoritarian elites, regarded as the only guarantors of Western interests, to contain Russia's perceived geopolitical comeback in the region and maintain “stability” as an end in itself rather than a precondition to consolidate democracy and rule of law.

After years of “enlargement fatigue”, culminated in the announcement of the Enlargement halt by Junker’s commission, the focus of European and Western interests in the Balkans shifted from democratisation and human rights to security issues like migration along the Balkan route, threats of Islamic radicalisation, and Russian geopolitical activism. In this context, “stable” – but corrupted and increasingly authoritarian – leaderships are largely tolerated, while expected to extensively use the rhetorics of “European values”.

The main concern in the WB6, rather than the alleged long-term instability, is indeed the consolidation of authoritarian tendencies along with economic stagnation – two dynamics reinforcing each other.

Montenegro, often regarded as a “EU success story in the Balkans”, is the most paradigmatic case of stability equating with squandering of public resources, clientelism, and corruption. Despite accusations of electoral fraud, Đukanović’s DPS maintains its grip on power since 1991, with full support from the West, which considers the current regime as the only guarantee of the country's Euro-atlantic integration. Even more so, after the alleged Russian-backed attempted coup d’etat – still under investigation – which marred the last political election in October 2016, on the eve of the country’s membership to NATO.

Meanwhile in Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić has consolidated his power through five electoral rounds over the last five years, eventually becoming president. While holding state institutions under control and skillfully balancing between the EU and Russia in international politics, Vučić has managed to successfully promote himself as a champion of challenging reforms on the path to European integration. His recent appointment of Ana Brnabić, the first woman and openly LGBT politician to become prime minister of Serbia, earned him accolades and the headlines of international news outlets, but for many analysts this move will not change anything in current Serbian politics, especially when it comes to the control Vučić exerts on the Serbian institutions, media, and economy.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, “stability” – a deadlock subordinating democracy and economic development to the agenda of ethnic political parties – is more of a curse than a blessing for the divided country. The protests of 2014 clearly expressed the population's frustration with the socio-economic issues largely ignored by political parties, but have so far failed to express any viable political alternative. In Kosovo as well, the quest for stability and for a leadership ready to negotiate with Serbia contributed to consolidate a corrupt elite, unable to tackle the long-term challenges of high unemployment, poverty, and weak institutions.

Macedonia, with its recent, deep crisis which risked to turn into a violent one, is another example of the risks of “stability at any price”. After ruling the country for ten years, seizing state institutions and turning to nationalist rhetoric for consent, former PM Nikola Gruevski gave up to the opposition only after two years of scandals, street protests, fierce struggle, international pressure, and the prospect of a complete breakdown of the small republic. It was only after a raid of the Parliament in April 2017 that the intervention by the US envoy unblocked the situation, overcoming resistances by president Ivanov to allow SDSM leader Zoran Zaev to form the new government. What was missing was not “stability”, but the willingness to respect democratic mechanism of political alternation.

The issue at stake is the kind of stability that the EU wants to promote in the region. If EU institutions and member states exclusively favour security concerns and economic interests, the European project runs the serious risk to associate itself with illiberal or semi-authoritarian regimes, undermining its still strong transformative power in the Balkans. Civil societies should be put once again at the centre of the dialogue, while democracy, rule of law, and human rights should not be overshadowed by – unquestionably important – security issues.

The price for upholding a short-term predictability of the political scenario in the WB6, translated into the present tolerance or even support for illiberal leaderships, is high. If the Western Balkans are deprived of a credible hope to access the European Union and of the resulting incentives to fulfill democratic conditionality, the current state of affairs could turn very quickly into a new, deeper instability.

Marzia Bona and Francesco Martino, OBC Transeuropa 

DOSSIER

The opening of the so called Western Balkan route in the summer of 2015 brought the region back to our living rooms and to political boardrooms. One could sense relief and hope among those long advocating for increased efforts on the side of the EU for the Thessaloniki agenda to reach its finalité. Relief because it looked like the immense strains the refugee wave put on the countries along the route did not seem to endanger the regional stability still feared to be fragile. Hope because it brought the region back into the EU spotlight after years of falling into oblivion.

But both, relief and hope were short lived.  A closer look revealed that those few (member states) which had long kept an eye on the US presence in the region and occasionally voiced concerns over the deteriorating economic situation, the state of democracy in the region and the broader security concerns were right about the need for a steady and comprehensive progress towards the accession of the countries of the region to the EU. Not because the bellical situation of the 1990s was feared to return, but because of the importance the region holds for the security of the EU and its citizens and for geopolitical standing of Europe, including for the EU’s capacity to promote peace, its values and sustainable development of Earth (to use the Treaties’ language).

The (initial?) response to the migration wave focused on the security of the EU and its citizens and demonstrated the EU’s weaknesses precisely with regard to its geopolitical standing. It was not until Ms Mogherini’s statement upon her return from the region on 6 March 2017 saying that “/t/he Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played,” followed by a European Council discussion on the region and President’s conclusions of the 9 March 2017 recommitting the EU to seek a comprehensive progress on the region’s path to the EU, demonstrated that the gravity of situation really sunk in in Brussels. Still, the Rome declaration of 25 March 2017 felt short of reassuring the Western Balkans countries (formally) aspiring to join the EU that they are also seen as a soon-to-be part of the family.

That the region is part of the Euro-Atlantic security space, however, has not been doubted in Europe since long. The region had been surrounded by NATO members since 2004, Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009 and Montenegro as the youngest member acceded in June 2017. The other countries participate in its Partnership for Peace Programme since at least a decade. Numerous EU-lead and funded processes, projects and programmes are under way to support the humane and dignified approach to migrants and to strengthen the borders of the Western Balkan countries. Progress, praise and success are far more common than criticism. Numbers of foreign fighters coming from the region and joining Daesh or Al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq as well as either side in the conflict in Ukraine; investigations into weapons used in terrorist attacks in Western Europe showing origin in the region, and reports of Islamic fundamentalism on the rise (especially home-grown as opposite to imported) have led to an expanded and strengthened EU’s anti-terrorist focus on the region and increased intelligence cooperation.

While the challenges are common, their depth and the depth of what is common, remains to be tackled. First, in the current geopolitical situation the regional leaders balance between the Moscow-Ankara axis and the Euro-Atlantic shield on the chessboard that seems too big for concerns of millions of people on the ground and in which the leaders rip off benefits from both sides. Fragile regional security serves the nationalist card. Second, even if the numbers of first-time asylum seekers from the region in the EU member states dropped sharply (following change in policies e.g. in Germany), the problem of migration from the countries of the region (as opposite to ‘through’ them) is not sufficiently and comprehensively addressed. Third, while foreign fighters from the region have various reasons for leaving for Syria, Iraq or Ukraine, their age shows that little can be explained through their experience and involvement in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The hypotheses related to socio-economic reasons and lack of perspective have more ground.

The common thread linking the EU and the Western Balkans on the three issues of security, migration and terrorism is perspective: perspective of joining the EU, perspective of economic progress the proceeds of which would be shared across the population, and perspective of freedom of state from (one) party politics. Closer ties forged with the security sector from across the region in the framework of migration wave management and broader security cooperation must be made to support these three perspectives. But the perspectives must be renewed by unequivocal political commitment and innovative economic approach of the EU.

Sabina Lange, Senior Lecturer and European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, and Senior Associate Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

 DOSSIER

Imagine for a moment that the so-called Western Balkan countries were as rich and democratically consolidated as Switzerland, Norway or even tiny Iceland: would you doubt for a second that the EU leaders would not beg them to join the Union? Especially after Brexit has instilled so much impending doom into minds of the political class in Berlin, Paris and elsewhere. Accepting rich and politically straightforward new members would be a welcome remedy against Angst in the corridors of power throughout the continent!

However, what is at offer are five countries in southeast Europe (or six, if you count Kosovo to be a sovereign state – which five EU members state do not do - but here the political travails start already….), poor and bothersome. There is an unbreakable nexus between political institutions, democracy, rule of law and socio-economic trends. Almost every country in the region has experienced increasing poverty and worsening living conditions in comparison to the pre-1990 levels, together with de-industrialisation, low employment rates and high unemployment. In addition, the EU financial and economic crisis hit the Balkan countries disproportionally due to their by this time close links and at the same time absence of the right to use EU solidarity mechanisms to ameliorate the effects.

The GDP of the Southeast Europe Six (SEE6 in the parlance of the World Bank) stagnates at around a third of the EU-28 average. However, from an economic and political perspective, the pre-accession countries in the Balkans are already part of the European Union (and geographically surrounded by EU member states), sharing 76% of their total trade in goods with the EU within a nearly completely liberalised trade regime. Between the years 2005 and 2016, the deficit of the Western Balkan countries in trade with the European Union added up to almost 94 billion euro.  In order to come up for the import bill and cover the void in the state coffers, the Western Balkan countries continue taking fresh loans – mostly from banks from EU countries. The present external debt of the region is estimated to be higher than 100 billion Euro. Italian, Austrian, French, German and Greek banks command around 90% of the banking capital in the region.

So far EU integration seems to have augmented the structural problems of the SEE6. Their competitiveness rests mainly on providing cheap local labour particularly for German and Italian manufacturers. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) pointed out that the Western Balkan governments have engaged in “fiscal depreciation” over recent years in an attempt to improve competitiveness. This means that they increased VAT rates while slashing income taxes and social security contributions. The Viennese institute determined that this may have helped promote import substitution and exports. At the same time, however, fiscal depreciation “increased the burden on low-income groups while providing relief to top earners”. Furthermore, the conclusion of a new study published by the London School of Economics (LSE) was that it is an “unlikely outcome” that improving competitiveness of the Western Balkan countries and inducing export led growth will be attained by continuing with austerity policies.

According to a recent calculation by the World Bank, if the EU stagnated for the next two decades, and the Western Balkans achieved an annual GDP growth rate higher than six percent (twice higher than now) they would catch up with the average GDP of the EU28. Plainly, the chances for an economic convergence between the Western Balkans and the EU are slim. Just the opposite – the spill-over effects of Eurozone crisis to the Western Balkans and their lack of competitiveness on the global markets against the backdrop of a rapidly aging population and increasing emigration from the region point to even more socio-economic depravation in the future. Also, add to this the poor performance of the judiciary and other important political institutions and wide-spread corruption, and it becomes utterly clear why the majority of the people in the Western Balkans and especially the young (the unemployment rate among the youth in the region is between 40 and 70 percent) are losing hope that perspectives might brighten in their life-time.

Thus, the Trieste summit in July could be the last exit from the present road which only steers the EU and the Western Balkans further apart. If the EU is serious with further enlargement, than zero hour has come to launch a plan to boost the socio-economic development in the region. In Trieste, the EU leaders should make it clear that they accept this new agenda at the threshold of the new EU institutional cycle in 2019 with elections to the European Parliament, a new Commission and a new EU budget. 

Dušan Reljić, head of the Brussels office of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

DOSSIER

Italy’s foreign policy has traditionally considered the Balkan region as a key area of political, economic and even cultural projection since its own unification process in the late 19^th century. This made the history of Italy and of the Balkans increasingly, albeit often problematically, intertwined.

The past 15 years have been marked by a deepening of Italy’s multi-dimensional and multi-level interaction with non-EU Balkans. This relationship has many components, building on a deep-rooted tradition of bilateral diplomatic relations and international agreements which cover a variety of issues and themes. In this context, Italy considers Serbia and Albania as the two ‘pillars’ of the region and the most important countries for its national agenda, as demonstrated by the regular, ‘trilateral’ diplomatic process between Rome, Belgrade and Tirana.

It should not sound surprising, therefore, that Italy has always been a vocal supporter of EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans. Rome ultimately deems the national interests at stake in the region – in particular, trade, investment and soft and hard security concerns - to be best safeguarded by the mid-term EU integration of the Balkans. As such, it has traditionally described the ultimate European perspective of the region as a strategic interest, due to the positive effects of European integration on domestic and regional reconciliation in the Balkans, its benefits for their institutional stability and internal security, the expected opportunities for Italy coming from EU-spurred socio-economic development in the region, and the likely rebalancing of Europe’s geopolitical equilibrium between northern and southern Member States, following EU’s enlargement to South-Eastern Europe.

The current EU enlargement strategy is thus assessed positively by Italy, albeit with some critical points. Rome still considers “sticks and carrots” as the best way to encourage reforms and gradual alignment with the EU acquis. The progress made by Serbia and Albania between 2014 and 2017 is viewed by Rome as an example of the relative success of EU conditionality. Given the crucial importance attached by Rome to the consolidation of the rule of law, Italy welcomes the European Commission’s insistence on ‘fundamentals first’, including having Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) opened early and closed late in the accession negotiations. Likewise, Rome deems the “regatta approach” as the only viable strategy for the region. This is in light of the precedents that have been set by Slovenia and Croatia, the perceived differences in political maturity and socio-economic development among candidates, and the need to inject a dynamic of positive competition. However, it is of paramount importance for Italy that the “enlargement fatigue” currently experienced by the EU does not generate a parallel “accession fatigue” among Balkans applicants.

Having said this, despite its reiterated pro-EU enlargement standing, the Italian approach to the Western Balkans and their EU path remains affected by some structural constraints. These include cyclic drops in the attention paid to the region by Italy’s political elites, also due to growing (euro)scepticism of ordinary citizens, and the coordination challenge posed by multiple and sometimes overlapping frameworks of regional cooperation, including the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative, the Central European Initiative, the Adriatic Euroregion and the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region.

Further vulnerabilities also lie in the need for stronger diplomatic focus, alongside regional security, economic and migratory issues, on the overall state of democracy and freedom of expression in the Western Balkans, and the recurring lack of sufficient political leverage to influence EU decision-making when compared to other European capitals, as witnessed in the early phases of the Berlin Process in 2015, and by the successful British-German initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 2014.

The imminent Trieste Summit on the Western Balkans, emblematically hosted by the Italian Government in the former port city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, could and should represent, as recently stated by the Italian Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano “a unique and unmissable opportunity to ensure that the European prospect of the Western Balkans does not become an abstract and distant concept, and to solidify every possible bridge between the Western Balkans and Italy, and between Italy and Europe”.

It is clearly time for Italy to rediscover its ‘Balkan vocation’, by matching a more proactive, comprehensive and participatory diplomatic engagement with a continued support for a credible and effective EU enlargement strategy in the region.  The Trieste Summit might indeed provide an essential step in this direction.

Involvement of international actors has been essential in resolving conflicts, rebuilding, and helping reconcile the Western Balkans in the last few decades. Throughout the1990s, foreign intervention was meant to stop the bloodshed in the region after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, ending the wars in the region. The Western players, the United States (U.S.) in collaboration with the European countries, managed to achieve peace in the Western Balkans. They brokered the Dayton Accords in 1995 that put an end to the three-and-a-half-year Bosnian War, and in 1999, prevented the genocide in Kosovo as a result of the U.S. led NATO intervention in the region. 

In 2000s, while the U.S. continued to view the Western Balkans as a strategic region and supported its European integration, the responsibility for the day-to day business in the democratic and economic transition of the region was mainly ceded to the European Union (EU). The belief was that enlargement, a core priority of the EU since the 1990s, and widely acknowledged, as the most powerful instrument of EU’s foreign policy, would have been the most effective conflict prevention mechanism in the Western Balkans. However, the influence of the U.S. has been unparalleled, especially in critical cases such as in supporting the EU facilitated dialogue for the normalisations of the relations between Belgrade and Pristina in 2012. 

The region has moved forward from the conflict situation of 20 years ago and progress has been evident. Today, three of the countries of the region have turned from security consumers into security providers, becoming NATO members (Albania, Croatia, Montenegro). Croatia has also achieved EU membership in 2013. Others are candidate or aspirant countries of NATO and EU. 

But unfortunately, while the situations seemed very optimistic in early 2000s, today, we continue to face “new” Balkan problems. Things are getting more chaotic in the region, with political and ethnic divisions more entrenched than before, mainly as result of a spectrum of issues from economic underperformance and corruption to lack of opportunities and vision for the future. 

Internal structural weaknesses became glaringly evident in the aftermath of the 2009 global economic crisis that hit the Western Balkans through the Eurozone finance and trade spillover effects. After battling a double-dip economic recession, the Western Balkans are experiencing a sluggish recovery, weak economic performance, skyrocketing unemployment, and dangerous sovereign debts. The quality of democracy, market economy, political management and rule of law remain concerning. Doubts are raised that democracy in the Western Balkans has turned more into power struggles, creating a gap between elites and citizens. The new institutions of market economy are undermined by the informal economy and the widening economic and social disparities. Organized crime and corruption remain serious challenges. 

Democratic reforms are crumbling in the region. The vacuum of power created by instable and weak institutions and a lack of meaningful political action in the enlargement process since the 2014´s five-year moratorium, has left an ample space for new external players to exploit. The biggest challenge is the EU´s weakening appeal to deal with the unresolved issues in the region. 

The consensus remains, both within and outside the region, that the only realistic project for achieving stability and development in the Western Balkans is integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. While, accession of Montenegro in NATO, strongly supported by the U.S., sends very positive signals to the whole region, unfortunately the EU integration of the Western Balkans remains stuck between declarative political promises and reality on the ground. After accepting Croatia in 2013, it seems that the EU has lost its appetite for further expansion, and the completion of the “European project” for the region is threatened by serious challenges, leaving in its backyard a vacuum of poor and unstable countries. 

This presents serious hurdles for the democratic transformation of the region. Unemployment (68%) and economic hardship (55%) remain the main concerns of the population in the Western Balkans.

[1]

Social discontent is deep, the poverty is enduring and levels of inequality are increasing, encouraging outward migration of people. Reasons for emigration are clear. With income and institutional quality differentials between the Western Balkans and Western Europe still wide and actually widening, the push and pull factors driving emigration will likely persist even stronger in the future. 

With the dim prospects of the Western Balkans getting into the EU, the easiest way to the EU for its people has been through migration. With an average per capita income of just $ 4,936 – equal to only 14% of the average per capita incomes of the EU countries ($34,860) – the EU’s attraction is palpable. The past is serving as prologue. Leaving the region is highly desirable, with every other person contemplating to looking for a job abroad. At the same time, this is the worst indicator of the state of affairs in the region.

In 2015 alone, more than 130,000 irregular migrants from Kosovo, Albania and Serbia, were asylum seekers in the EU, with Germany as their main destination, although a large majority of the asylum seekers were sent back home, since all Western Balkan countries are now considered “safe countries.” 

Objective prospects of the Western Balkans joining the EU any time soon are fading, throwing the future of the small region into more doubts by the high degree of “enlargement fatigue” that had gripped more than half of the EU citizens. Despite the fact that, signs of this “enlargement fatigue” are partly unsatisfactory reforms and structural difficulties in the current candidates in the western Balkans, sending de-stimulating messages to the region for further enlargement is creating the unintended consequences of “reforms fatigue” and leaving ample space for foreign players to explore. 

The prolonged transition process and the dire perspective for an eventual convergence with rich European countries have contributed to a plunge of public support for the EU. The negative signalling has created a deep sense of pessimism around the region, with only 39% of people in the Western Balkans thinking EU membership is a good thing, and a large number (36%) having a neutral opinion.

[2]

Albania and Kosovo are the only exceptions. Negative perceptions prevail in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Serbia, with large numbers thinking that their country will never become an EU member. A key part of the explanation is a wrong-headed form of nostalgia – about the (communist) past being better than the challenges of today. Quite self-destructively, the lack of successful developments in the region will continue to feed growing anti-EU sentiments. Pessimism is real, but scapegoating the EU for the slow transformation of the Western Balkans is unfair. This brings a dangerous negative feedback loop. The overriding problem with the prevailing pessimism is that, wholly independent of the question of EU membership, this languishing does not encourage economic, political and social reforms that have stalled across the region – and which the countries very much need for their own sake. 

In this situation, Moscow's meddling in the Western Balkans has increased, while the West's attention has lost focus from the region. Russia has long stoked divisions in this region in order to shore up its strategic advantage over Europe, and increased pessimism and indifference toward Western institutions is making things easier for the Kremlin. In a geo-political rivalry with the West, Russia is trying to project its power as a global player in the region, using the Western Balkans as buffer to reassert its sphere of interest.  Attempting to weaken the ties of the region with the West, complicating, or even excluding NATO and EU membership, Russia´s main objective is the creation of a "non- alignment zone" in the region. Russian influence in the region is not abstract; it also has strong economic interests. The Russian presence is not confined to Serbia, as its natural strategic long-time partner, but stretches across the entire region. Reasserting its role as the protector of Orthodox Christian population, and through a mix of hybrid tools, Russia is acting as an opportunistic spoiler to achieve influence through corruption, coercion, businesses, and state propaganda, with the objective to destabilize the region and stall its Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Moscow is actively politicizing and exacerbating existing ethnic and religious tensions in the region. Russia publicly opposed Montenegro´s membership to NATO, allegedly even supporting a failed coup attempt at the end of 2016 designed to stop the process. Macedonia, an EU candidate country since 2005, in recent months has been witnessing a flare-up of political clashes. By exploiting the constitutional crisis in Macedonia, Moscow backed Macedonia president's decision to block a parliamentary majority to form a government, and even accused NATO and the EU for creating the crisis. Russia is inflaming internal political tensions in Macedonia but also relations between Serbia and Kosovo through traditional propaganda themes and dangerous rhetoric of clashes between "Greater Albania" and "Greater Serbia." 

Other new players in the Western Balkans are Turkey and the Gulf states, which have stepped up their support for Muslims, but the help they provide isn’t always benign. Unfortunately, some of the leaders in the Western Balkans are seeking to leverage "the Russian challenge" to extract concessions from the Western partners while paying lip service to reform efforts. On the other side, EU enlargement fatigue is also used as a scapegoat for not pressing with internal reforms. 

Why should the Western Balkans matter to the West? To begin with, we should not forget its strategic position and proximity to the EU. As part of the natural Europe, any destabilization in the Western Balkans can quickly become a problem for Europe. Only few years ago, the Western Balkans was the main route of transit for the refugees and irregular migrants that entered Europe, coming from Middle East and North Africa.  Uncontrolled transit route poses not only humanitarian, but also high security risks, including terrorism.   

In such situation, the West faces an important choice: treat the Western Balkans as a key strategic asset, or risk losing the region to Russian influence and infiltration by Islamist extremism. In this light, the U.S. engagement to the region is increasing, as a country that has extraordinary influence in the Western Balkans. Visits of members of U.S. Congress and representatives of the Department of State have helped raise the attention of the American diplomacy towards the region. This engagement is crucial, not only to enhance stability and foster economic and democratic development, but also to advance U.S. security goals, acting as a bulwark against Islamic radicalization in the region. In fact, in the recent months, the U.S. diplomacy, in collaboration with the EU, has been crucial is solving political crises in the Western Balkans. As such, visit of the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Hoyt Yee, helped forge an agreement between politicians in Macedonia to allow a peaceful transition of power and managing to solve the deep political and institutional crises that had captured the country in the last few years, narrowly averting a disaster in Macedonia. In Albania, the U.S. diplomacy brokered a deal between the main political parties to hold normal elections, supporting the European “McAllister package,” after the Democratic Party had threatened to boycott, risking to slide the country in a dangerous political crisis. A similar solution is also expected in Kosovo for the creation of the new governments, since none of the three main parties has won sufficient seats to hold a clear majority for the creation of the government. 

A joint commitment of EU-U.S. diplomacy is imperative in the region aimed at fostering democratic reforms, promoting moderation, and undermining the appeal of radical Islam. The joint strategy should be based on strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, and building accountability mechanisms in the region. Albania is an example where the U.S. and the EU are working together in pushing the judiciary reform in the country, which is crucial for the fight against corruption and advancing democracy in the country. 

Without anchors to Western institutions, illiberal democracies and rising religious fundamentalism are likely to become the norm in the region. Amidst such dire circumstances, the EU remains to be seen as the anchor power in the region. In reality, the Western Balkans have not entirely disappeared from the radar of the EU institutions.  Despite a recognized degree of “enlargement fatigue” by many member states, the EU is keeping the enlargement policy alive in its backyard. Countries, such as Germany are trying to keep the process open, with initiatives such as the Berlin process

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, aimed at sending a message of support and reaffirmation for the European future of the region, by fostering economic cooperation and political stability within the region-- although without clear timelines. This realistic engagement with the region (the fourth meeting, the Trieste meeting is upcoming) is meant to prevent further damage from the “reform fatigue” that already manifests itself in the region. At the same time serves as a reminder of the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit’s promise of membership

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to the Western Balkans. “Europeanizing” a region still dogged by mistrust, underdeveloped economies, weak rule of law and underrepresented civil society could be understood as a test of credibility and capacity for the EU, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. While, each of the seven rounds of the EU enlargement had different motivations and consequences due to varying geographical, political and economic characteristics of the new members, the underlying motivation has not changed: securing Europe. 

The longer it takes the Western Balkans to join EU or at least have some tangible progress in the accession path one thing is for sure:  whether inside the EU or outside, these countries on the EU’s edge, will pose a considerable risk to the future of the overall European project. Only a serious road map for EU accession would provide countries in the region with concrete incentives for political and economic reform. This could lead to increased regional cooperation, thereby diminishing interethnic tensions and creating an overall stabilizing effect for the region and continent as a whole. The Western Balkans needs a new type of a “Marshall Plan” to speed up its economic and institutional development, on one main condition, to make the economic and technical aid available only if countries are really committed to collaborate with each other. 

European Union is the only game in town. However, the European idea cannot be promoted without changing the current political habitus in the Western Balkans. Mature stages in the EU integration should bring along questions about transparency and accountability of the elites. The final responsibility remains with the political leaders in the region. Only a more serious commitment and higher scrutiny of the EU in the Western Balkans will foster fundamental political, economic and social transformation. 

Dr. Valbona Zeneli is Program Director, Black Sea and Eurasia at the College of International and Security Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The views presented in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 

Political and economic prospects in the Western Balkans seemed promising in early 2000s, with countries leaning to the European Union for a prosperous future. Unfortunately, new and old Balkan problems are (re)emerging today, with political and ethnic divisions more entrenched than before due to poor economic performance, instability, corruption and lack of clear–cut prospects for the future. In the meantime, rising euroskepticism and "enlargement fatigue" in the EU have resulted into a stand–by of future enlargements. This may lead to a further deterioration of the fragile socio-political context in the Western Balkans. With this in mind, Germany launched the Berlin Process in 2014 with a view to scaling–up regional integration in the Western Balkans, while keeping alive the prospects of full EU membership. The Trieste summit on 12 July is the 4th meeting of the countries involved in the Berlin Process. Will this be a last call for the EU to stabilize the neighbouring region, accelerate its democratic processes and lay the groundwork for future EU membership?

	Western Balkans and the EU: Still in stand–by
	Erwan Fouéré  CEPS
	Instability in the Region: the remedies are long–term
	Marzia Bona and Francesco Martino  OBC Transeuropa
	Tackling common challenges: security, migration, terrorism
	Sabina Lange  EIPA and EUISS
	Boosting growth in Southeast Europe
	Dušan Reljić  SWP
	From Moscow to Washington: big actors at play
	Valbona Zeneli  George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
	A view from Italy: back to the Balkans?
	Andrea Frontini  EPC